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I. INTRODUCTION
Factual works, because of their very nature, provide a unique
illustration of the tensions underlying the policy of copyright law,
which seeks to maintain incentives for authors to create new works
balanced against the public interest in the dissemination of these
works for widespread public access.' Perhaps no work captures this
tension better than the purely factual compilation. Telephone direc-
tories, restaurant guides, rental property lists, and data bases of
stock quotations are immensely useful and society benefits from
their creation by various compilers. However, because the individ-
ual facts contained within these compilations are not protected by
copyright law, subsequent compilers have often used the facts in
their predecessors' works to produce competing factual works.
Although society may benefit from the larger number of compila-
tions at its disposal, original compilers argue that their incentive to
produce factual works is undermined if later compilers can freely
copy facts from original compilations. To address this tension be-
tween incentive and free access to facts, courts have applied a vari-
1. Robert C. Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Protection of
Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 516, 519 (1981) [hereinafter Denicola]; Rob-
ert Gorman, Fact or Fancy? The Implications for Copyright, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 650,
650-63 (1982) [hereinafter Gorman].
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ety of copyright theories that largely favor the commercial
investment and interests of original compilers.
Not surprisingly, the compilation theories applied by courts
have varied from circuit to circuit. Some courts have granted copy-
right protection based on the physical arrangement of a compilation
while others have grounded protection in the original compiler's in-
vestment of time and money in producing his compilation. On
March 27, 1991 the United States Supreme Court clarified the stan-
dard for copyright protection in purely factual compilations with its
decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.2
The 9-0 decision in Feist - a case over alleged copyright infringe-
ment in telephone directory white pages - established arrange-
ment and selection of information as the proper tests for copyright
in compilations. In making its decision, the Court rejected a popu-
lar compilation theory which focused on the labor of the compiler.
Feist is important because it clarifies the compilation theories
and reiterates the traditionally low standard of originality required
for copyright protection. It is also significant because its reasoning
has important consequences for publishers of the quintessential
modem factual work: the electronic data base.3 Electronic data ba-
ses of facts pose unique problems for the compilation theories be-
cause of their inherent flexibility and the ease with which they can
be accessed. The character and uses of data bases underscore the
need for a compilation theory that meets the incentive and dissemi-
nation goals of copyright law while recognizing the need for reason-
able commercial and noncommercial access to the facts contained
in data bases. This access is especially important because many data
bases are the sole source of certain kinds of factual information and
because the largest users of data bases are often data base publishers
themselves.
This Comment contends that the selection theory of compila-
tions as defined by Feist is the best theory for assessing whether an
electronic data base of factual information is protected by copy-
right. The selection theory's focus on the judgment and discretion
of a compiler in designing his compilation mirrors the process of
designing and compiling an electronic data base. Because the
2. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
3. For example, data bases containing financial, credit reporting, demographic, biblio-
graphic, economic, and industrial information are typical data bases which could be affected
by Feist. Brief of the Information Industry Association and ADAPSO, the Computer Services
Industry Association, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 7-9, Feist Publi-
cations, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (No. 89-1909) [hereinafter IIA/
ADAPSO Brief].
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Supreme Court set a very low originality standard, data bases which
reflect more than the most obvious and basic information are likely
to be protected under the selection theory of Feist. Most impor-
tantly, the selection theory provides copyright protection to compil-
ers of factual works without extending protection to
uncopyrightable facts. This maintains the compiler's incentive to
produce these works, while preserving the public interest in wide-
spread access to factual information.
In Part II, this Comment describes factual compilations and
the interests of both users and developers in these works.
Part III summarizes the general foundations of copyright law,
the types of factual works protected historically, and the basic state-
ments of modem compilation law.
Part IV of this Comment examines the three primary theories
of compilation law as illustrated by the Feist case. This Part illus-
trates and analyzes compilation law using statutory and case law
sources, law review commentaries, and three complementary
sources from Feist: the Supreme Court briefs filed by the parties and
one amicus curiae brief, the transcript of the oral arguments before
the Court, and the Court's Feist opinion.
Finally, Part V of this Comment illustrates the nature of an
electronic data base of factual information and describes the process
of creating a data base. The analysis applies the compilation theo-
ries argued in, and clarified by, the Feist case to electronic data ba-
ses. Although each compilation theory has some applicability to
electronic data bases, this Part demonstrates that the selection the-
ory provides the best mechanism for determining whether a data
base is protectable as a compilation under copyright law.
II. THE NATURE OF COMPILATIONS OF FACTS AND THE
INTERESTS OF DEVELOPERS AND USERS OF FACTUAL
WORKS
A. Creating a Compilation of Facts
Printed compilations of facts are developed in a manner similar
to electronic data bases of facts. In Feist, the amicus curiae brief
filed by the trade associations whose members generate, distribute,
and transmit electronic compilations describes the basic steps the
developer of a copyrightable data base follows.4 First, the developer
identifies a market for the compilation and assesses the needs, capa-
bilities, and preferences of the user. Next, the developer locates the
4. Id. at 2.
Vol. 8
DAT BASESAND FEIST
sources of information for the compilation. Frequently, there are
many sources, each of which the developer must examine to identify
the facts needed for his data base. Finally, once the developer ar-
ranges for access to all of the sources of information, typically
through licenses, he then edits and presents the information in the
data base in a manner which maximizes its clarity and usefulness.5
B. The Interests of Developers and Users of Compilations of
Facts
Compilations, especially electronic data bases, are big business
today.' Because compilations require enormous investments of
money, time, and labor, the developers of compilations argue that
strong copyright protection is necessary to encourage development
of the information service industry. This argument is consistent
with the economic underpinnings of copyright law.7 However, these
same developers recognize the need for reasonable access to compi-
lations in order to develop new compilations and services.' This is
consistent with the public access aspect of copyright law.9 Commer-
cial access to compilations is important because the developers of
compilations are also their largest users. Typically, access to compi-
lations, especially electronic data bases, is governed by licenses. Yet
licenses are becoming less effective given the expansion of commu-
nications access to electronic data bases and the popularity of
"stand alone" sources such as compact disks."0 Thus, there is an
added burden placed on copyright law to resolve the tension be-
tween strong protection for developers of compilations and reason-
able access to compilations.
5. Id. at 18-19. The process of creating a data base is described later in this Comment.
See infra text accompanying notes 155-158.
6. Id. at 18. A government study estimated that revenues of the electronic information
service industry alone were $9 billion in 1990. Id. at 21 n.17 (citing U.S. DEp'T OF COM-
MERCE, 1990 INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK (1990)).
7. "The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant...
copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors." Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
8. IIA/ADAPSO Brief, supra note 3, at 2, 18.
9. Civil copyright law is a compromise between competing social policies -
one favoring the widest possible dissemination of new ideas and new forms of
expression, and the other giving writers and artists enough of a monopoly over
their works to ensure their receipt of fair material rewards for their efforts. The
first policy predominates, which means that the system of rewards is to be no
more extensive than is necessary in the long run to elicit a socially optional
[sic] [optimal] amount of creative activity.
United States v. Bily, 406 F. Supp. 726, 730 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (footnote omitted).
10. IIA/ADAPSO Brief, supra note 3, at 21.
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Private, noncommercial users of electronic data bases have a
strong interest in reasonable access to data bases in the same way
that a person who searches through a printed telephone directory
does. Neither the user of the data base nor the telephone directory
should be subject to copyright infringement for copying facts such
as a stock quote or telephone number. Developers of compilations
also do not want to scare users away from their compilations with
the threat of a copyright infringement suit.
III. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPILATIONS
Copyright law rests on a constitutional provision which grants
to Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." '1
The Copyright Act of 197612 ("Copyright Act") is the most recent
statutory codification of federal copyright law. The constitutional
provision and the Copyright Act exhibit the basic tension between
providing incentives to developers of new works balanced against
the public interest in access to these works. 13
Copyright protection subsists "in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression.., from which they can
be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device."14 The threshold re-
quirement for copyright protection, as defined by the case law and
embodied in the Copyright Act, is originality."5 Two additional
requirements are often subsumed under discussions of originality:
11. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1988).
13. "In attempting to fulfill its constitutional mandate... Congress has created a bal-
ance between the artist's right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection
and the public's need for access to creative works." Stewart v. Abend, 110 S. Ct. 1750, 1754
(1990).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
15. "The standard for originality is low." Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296. Originality implies
that an author makes more than a "trivial variation" so as to create something that is recog-
nizably his own. In this sense, originality means little more than a bar on copying. See Alfred
Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 103 (2d Cir. 1951). The Copyright Act
adopted the standard for originality developed by the courts. The standard does not include
any requirement of novelty, ingenuity, or aesthetic merit. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong.,
2d Sss. 51 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664.
Closely related to originality is creativity. Creativity is often implicitly required when the
subject matter of the copyright claim is extremely brief or is composed of factual information.
Courts usually do not make qualitative judgments as to creativity, so it usually means nothing
more than a work must show a minimum quantity, not quality, of authorship. Denicola,
supra note 1, at 521-22. See also Jack B. Hicks, Note, Copyright and Computer Databases: Is
Traditional Compilation Law Adequate?, 65 TEX. L. REv. 993, 998 (1987) [hereinafter Note].
19921 DATA BASES AND FEIST
authorship and fixation. 6 The limitations on copyright protec-
tion 17 and the standards for infringement"' are similarly defined by
the case law and the Copyright Act.
The first copyright statute, passed in 1790, extended protection
to maps, charts, and books.1 9 Compilations of facts have been pro-
tected by copyright throughout most of this century.20 Because the
subject matter of early copyright law was mostly informational or
factual, until the mid-nineteenth century copyright protection de-
fined authorship with respect to the labor expended in creating a
16. The early Supreme Court created a low standard for authorship by defining an
author as one "'to whom anything owes its origin; originator, maker ... ' Burrow-Giles
Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884) (citation omitted). The Court adopted
this same standard in Feist. 111 S. Ct. at 1288.
Fixation is a technical requirement that determines when federal copyright protection
attaches to a work. Fixation is the modem interpretation of the constitutional reference to
"Writings." Denicola, supra note 1, at 521. However, "writings" now includes a variety of
works such as literary, musical, dramatic, choreographic, pictorial, sculptural, and audiovi-
sual works. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). Prior to fixation, a work may be eligible for common
law or state statutory protection under a trade secret or misappropriation analysis.
17. The Copyright Act limits protection so that no protection extends "to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery." 17
U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). This section of the Copyright Act codifies the common law rule that
a copyright only protects the author's expression in her work, and does not extend to the idea
embodied in the work. See, eg., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("[A] copyright
gives no exclusive right to the art disclosed; protection is given only to the expression of the
idea - not the idea itself.") (footnote omitted); see also Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) ("It is
axiomatic that copyright does not protect ideas, but only expressions of ideas."). By limiting
the scope of copyright protection to the expression of an author, the underlying idea of the
work is free to be copied and improved upon by subsequent authors.
Copyright protection also does not extend to facts. See infra text accompanying note 41.
18. Copyright infringement occurs when one or more of an author's exclusive rights is
violated. The exclusive rights permit an author to make and distribute copies of her work,
prepare derivative works, and, if appropriate, perform and display her work. 17 U.S.C. § 106
(1988). The most common type of infringement is copying. "Absent copying there can be no
infringement of copyright." Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (footnote omitted).
Copying may be inferred if a potentially infringing copy is substantially similar to the copied
work and access to the copied work by the defendant is proven. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d
464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946).
Copying which exceeds the level of substantial similarity may be permitted by the fair
use doctrine, which permits reasonable, fair uses of another's work without authorization if
the policies of the copyright system would be furthered by the use. Denicola, supra note 1, at
524; 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
19. Leo J. Raskind, The Continuing Process of Refining and Adapting Copyright Princi-
pies, 14 CoLUM.-V.L.A. J.L. & ARTS 125, 129 (1990) (citing the Act of May 31, 1790, Ch.
15, 1 Stat. 24). See also Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value • Copyright Protec-
tion of Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1865, 1873 n.29 (1990) [hereinafter
Ginsburg].
20. Denicola, supra note 1, at 527 n.55 (citing the Copyright Act of 1909, Act of March
4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5(a), 35 Stat. 1076 (1909)).
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work and not with respect to the author's personal expression.
Later, in the mid- to late-nineteenth century the increase in literary
works refocused copyright on the author's personality and individu-
ality.22 The scope of early copyright protection for factual works
appears to have been very "thin" in that it protected only the pre-
cise work of the first author and no more.23
Under the Copyright Act, a compilation is the result of the
gathering together of information from assorted sources. The Copy-
right Act defines a compilation as a "work formed by the collection
and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a
whole constitutes an original work of authorship."24 The Copyright
Act expressly extends the subject matter of copyright to compila-
tions.2" Finally, the Copyright Act limits the scope of protection in
a compilation "to the material contributed by the author of such
work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in
the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the preexisting
material."26 This final caveat restricts copyright protection solely to
the original material contributed by the author or compiler. It
leaves the scope of copyright protection in any preexisting material
right where the compiler found it. This restriction highlights a key
problem of compilation theory: defining the protectable expression,
if any, in a highly factual compilation.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S COMPILATION ANALYSIS IN FEIST
PUBLICATIONS INC V. RURAL TELEPHONE SER VICE. Co.
This section of the Comment initially describes the facts of the
Feist case and its disposition by the lower courts. The remainder of
this section illustrates the basic concepts of compilation law as ar-
gued in Feist and examines the three primary doctrines of copyright
protection for compilations as argued by the parties in Feist and
analyzed by the Supreme Court.
21. See Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 1874-81.
22. See id. at 1874, 1881-88.
23. Id. at 1878.
24. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
25. "The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compilations
." 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988).
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A. The End of Copyright in Telephone Directory White
Pages
1. The Facts of Feist
Rural Telephone is a Kansas corporation that provides tele-
phone service to subscribers in northwest Kansas. As part of its
telephone service, Rural compiles, publishes, and distributes tele-
phone directories that list the telephone numbers for the geographi-
cal area in which Rural provides service. Rural's telephone
directories consist of white pages that list subscribers' names, ad-
dresses, and telephone numbers alphabetically and yellow pages
that list Rural's business subscribers alphabetically and also contain
classified advertising.27 The 1982-1983 telephone directory at issue
in Feist was marked with an appropriate notice identifying Rural as
the copyright holder.28
Feist Publications is an independent publisher of telephone di-
rectories which cover the geographical area served by Rural as well
as additional areas served by other telephone companies.29 Feist en-
tered into license agreements with the telephone companies serving
the areas covered by its directory. Under these agreements, the tele-
phone companies provided Feist with a list of their respective white
pages listings. Of the telephone companies in these areas, only Ru-
ral refused to license its white pages listings to Feist. Because Feist
could not license Rural's listings, in 1978 Feist took Rural's printed
telephone directory and removed the listings it could not use and
retained the remainder of the listings. Feist then sorted the listings
by town and sent them to verifiers whose job it was to call the
number in each listing to verify its correctness. The corrected lists
were returned to Feist who incorporated them into its directory.30
From 1979 through 1982, Feist continued to publish its direc-
tory making limited use of Rural's telephone white pages. In 1983,
Feist again made full use of the Rural white pages as it had in 1978,
including the use of verifiers. However, Rural, who had been suspi-
cious of Feist's activities, had inserted fictitious listings in its own
1982-1983 telephone directory. Four of these fictitious listings
slipped past Feist's verifiers and appeared in Feist's 1983
27. Feist, 1I1 . Ct. at 1286.
28. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214, 216 (D. Kan.
1987), aff'd, 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990) (unpublished opinion), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1282
(1991).
29. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1286.
30. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. at 217.
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directory.31
2. The Feist Decisions
Rural sued Feist for copyright infringement claiming that Feist
could not use Rural's white pages listings as a source for Feist's
directory.32 Rural argued that Feist must independently canvass or
survey the telephone subscribers whose names and numbers Feist
wanted to include in its directory. Feist responded that an in-
dependent canvass was economically unfeasible and unnecessary be-
cause the information in Rural's white pages was not protected by
copyright.33
The District Court for the District of Kansas granted summary
judgment to Rural because a series of cases indicated that tele-
phone directories are the proper subject matter of copyright. The
court thus found that the white pages of a telephone directory were
an original work of authorship. From this conclusion, and without
further discussion or analysis, the court then held that Rural had
demonstrated a valid copyright for its 1982-1983 directory.34 The
court did not explain how the fact that a telephone directory is the
proper subject matter of copyright automatically implied that Rural
owned a valid copyright in its directory.
The district court found that Feist copied Rural's white pages
through direct evidence: the copying of the fictitious listings from
the Rural directory which appeared in Feist's 1983 directory. The
court rejected Feist's substantial similarity and de minimis copying
31. Id. In its Supreme Court brief, Feist emphasized that Rural had inserted 28 ficti-
tious listings in the three directories beginning with the year 1980. None of these bogus list-
ings were included in Feist's directories for the corresponding years. Feist did admit that four
fictitious listings were "accidently included" in its 1983 directory. Brief for Petitioner at 10,
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (No. 89-1909) [herein.
after Feist Brief]. The 1983 Feist directory contained 46,878 alphabetized white pages list-
ings. Approximately 4,000 listings from the corresponding Rural directory appeared in the
Feist directory. Brief for Respondent at 3, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111
S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (No. 89-1909) [hereinafter Rural Brief]. 1,309 of these listings in Feist's
1983 white pages were identical to listings in Rural's 1982-1983 white pages. Feist, 111 S. Ct.
at 1286.
32. Feist did not dispute that yellow pages, which typically include advertising, instruc-
tions for using your telephone, and the like, are copyrightable. "This case involves only the
white pages listings ... nothing more." Reply Brief for Petitioner at 2, Feist Publications,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (No. 89-1909) [hereinafter Feist Reply
Brief]. See also Official Transcript at 21-23, Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co.,
No. 89-1909 (argued Jan. 9, 1991) [hereinafter Transcript] (available from Alderson Report-
ing Co., 1111 14th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005-5650; 1-800-FOR-DEPO).
33. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1287.
34. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 214 at 218.
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defenses.35 In its infringement analysis, the court accepted Rural's
argument that Feist was compelled to make an independent canvass
to secure the listings for its white pages directory.36 The court re-
jected Feist's argument that by re-arranging the information from
Rural's white pages Feist had escaped copyright infringement.37
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court in an unpublished opinion which echoed the district court's
reasoning. 8 On March 27, 1991 the United States Supreme Court
reversed the two lower courts and found in Feist's favor by a unani-
mous vote.39
B. Copyright Protection Does Not Extend to Individual Facts
The names, addresses, and telephone numbers in the white
pages listings at issue in Feist could not provide a clearer, more in-
tuitive example of why individual facts should not be protected by
copyright law. These facts owe their existence to no one: they are
the mere result of being given a name, moving into a particular lo-
cation, and being assigned a telephone number. Were copyright to
grant protection to the first person who noticed the results of partic-
ular events, common information such as the day's temperature, the
height of a well-known building, and the score of the local baseball
team's last game would be freely-exchanged only under threat of
copyright infringement. Such a scenario certainly does not advance
the constitutional mandate to promote the progress of the arts and
sciences.40
The policy that denies protection of individual facts supports
the copyright goal of promoting the progress of the arts and sci-
ences because it permits subsequent authors to build upon the work
of their predecessors by using unprotected facts to create new
works.4" If copyright extended to individual facts, the command to
promote the sciences and arts would be compromised because of the
35. Id. at 218-19.
36. Id. at 219. "The uncontroverted evidence before the court reveals that [Feist] exten-
sively used [Rural's] directory without first conducting an independent canvass. Thus, even
though [Feist] later verified the material, [Feist] clearly infringed [Rural's] copyright." Id.
37. "The fact that [Feist] may have reorganized the material it gained from [Rural] or
may have added other material does not preclude a finding of infringement." Id. at 218.
38. Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 916 F.2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990) (opin-
ion printed at 40 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 503, 504 (1990)), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1282
(1991).
39. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
40. See supra text accompanying note 11.
41. Denicola, supra note 1, at 525.
1992]
COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 8
increased costs to each author for procuring the factual building
blocks for his new work. In short, it would be less attractive for
later authors to create new works that build upon existing works.
On a technical level, copyright law does not protect individual
facts because they fail to meet the statutory requirement of original-
ity.42 Facts are simply discoveries which do not owe their origin to
any author.43 The Copyright Act follows this distinction and ex-
cludes individual facts from protection by classifying them as dis-
coveries.' A Copyright Office regulation indicates that public
domain information, among other things, does not qualify for copy-
right protection.45
Both the Petitioner and Respondent in Feist agreed that indi-
vidual facts were not protectable under copyright law46 and the
42. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. In a non-legal sense, facts are commonly
thought of as objectively real things or events whose existence can be verified. A dictionary
definition of "fact" reads: "1. Something put forth as objectively real. 2. Something objec-
tively verified. 3. a. Something with real, demonstrable existence.... b. The quality of being
real or actual. 4. Something carried out or performed." WEBaSTR'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNI-
vERsITy DICTIONARY 460 (Trade ed. 1984).
43. "Thus, since facts do not owe their origin to any individual, they may not be copy-
righted and are part of the public domain available to every person." Miller v. Universal City
Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1369 (5th Cir. 1981). But cf Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 1912-
16. Professor Ginsburg argues that the fact-expression distinction may not be fundamental to
copyright doctrine. She posits that facts in "high authorship" works like historical novels
should be protected only to the extent of the author's subjective contributions. This would
leave the facts available for subsequent authors while leaving a substantial amount of protect-
able material for the original author. By contrast, Professor Ginsburg argues that facts in
"low authorship" works like telephone directories should be protected by copyright lest the
incentive to create these types of work be undermined by simply copying facts from an earlier
compiler's directory, for example. Professor Ginsburg does recognize, however, the possibili-
ties for a monopoly in facts under her approach and she frames the solution as a balance
between securing the commercial value of low authorship works while promoting the crea-
tion of informational works in general. Id. at 1916.
44. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The first person to find a fact has not created the fact but has
merely discovered it.
45. These are examples of works not subject to copyright: "Works consisting entirely of
information that is common property containing no original authorship, such as, for example:
Standard calendars, height and weight charts, tape measures and rulers, schedules of sporting
events, and lists or tables taken from public documents or other common sources." 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.1(d) (1991).
In addition, short phrases in simple instructions do not qualify for copyright protection.
37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a). See, eg., E.H. Tate Co. v. Jiffy Enter., 16 F.R.D. 571, 572 (E.D. Pa.
1954) ("It seems to me that it is little short of absurd to apply the copyright law to the words
'Apply hook to wall' in a perfectly natural explanation on how to use an article."). Facts are
analogous to unprotectable short phrases to the extent that both are building blocks for many
works. Without free access to short phrases like "Apply hook to wall" later authors would be
forced to create their own unique expression for simple, often trivial, ideas. (The results could
be interesting, however: "Fasten clasp to vertical plasterboard?")
46. Feist Brief, supra note 31, at 15, 17-18; Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 24.
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Supreme Court began its analysis from this basic premise.47 The
Court noted the "undeniable tension" between refusing copyright
protection for individual facts and permitting protection for compi-
lations of purely factual information.48 Because copyright law offers
no solace to an author who wishes to govern the individual facts he
collects, his only incentive to produce factual works lies in the copy-
right protection offered to entire compilations of facts. As made
clear by the Court in Feist, originality is the touchstone for copy-
right protection in a compilation.49
C. The Compilation Theories Argued and Applied in Feist
The Feist case is about originality. The issue was whether
purely factual information, 50 arranged in a standardized format,
showed sufficient originality as a compilation to warrant copyright
protection."' The Supreme Court defined originality for factual
compilations in terms of the statutory definition of Section 101: a
compiler's selection and arrangement of information, if indepen-
dently made with a minimal degree of creativity, is sufficiently origi-
nal to invoke copyright protection.5 2
Feist attacked Rural's copyright claim on these statutory
grounds. Feist argued that Rural's purely factual white pages list-
ings do not meet the Section 101 requirements for protection as a
47. Feist, II S. Ct. at 1287.
48. Id. at 1287.
49. "The sine qua non of copyright is originality. Originality is a constitutional
requirement." Id. at 1287-88.
50. This Comment assumes that facts are composed of words and numbers. Although it
is possible to create a compilation of graphical information, this Comment does not consider
the consequences of treating images as facts.
51. Under Section 103(b) of the Copyright Act, the Feist case can also be said to turn
on the question of whether Feist copied unprotected preexisting facts or copied original mate-
rial contributed by Rural to its white pages listings. See Feist Brief, supra note 31, at 18-22;
Feist Reply Brief, supra note 32, at 9-10; Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 17-18; IIA/ADAPSO
Brief, supra note 3, at 14. However, the originality of the individual listings in Rural's white
pages was not an issue because the names, addresses, and telephone numbers alone did not
qualify for copyright protection.
52. Factual compilations... may possess the requisite originality. The compila-
tion author typically chooses which facts to include, in what order to place
them, and how to arrange the collected data so that they may be used effec-
tively by readers. These choices as to selection and arrangement, so long as
they are made independently by the compiler and entail a minimal degree of
creativity, are sufficiently original that Congress may protect such compilations
through the copyright laws.... Thus, even a directory that contains absolutely
no protectible [sic] written expression, only facts, meets the constitutional min-
imum for copyright protection if it features an original selection or
arrangement.
Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1289 (citations omitted).
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compilation. Feist framed three requirements for copyright protec-
tion in compilations under the Copyright Act:
(1) There must be the collection and assembling of data,
(2) exhibiting sufficient selection, coordination, or arrange-
ment of the data, and
(3) that as a result of the selection, coordination, or arrange-
ment the compilation "as a whole" constitutes an original
work of authorship.
5 3
Under this standard, Feist concluded that Rural's white pages
were not copyrightable. First, Feist argued that Rural's white pages
exhibited no selection, coordination, or arrangement because Rural
received the listings as a byproduct of providing telephone service.
Further, Rural published all of its subscriber listings thereby elimi-
nating any selection. Finally, Feist argued that the alphabetical ar-
rangement of the listings in Rural's directory failed to satisfy the
coordination or arrangement prong of Section 101.11
Rural attempted to refute Feist's arguments by citing the very
low standard for originality." Rural then argued at length that di-
rectories have traditionally been copyrightable subject matter;56
that the legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1976 indicates
that Congress intended to adopt the low standard for originality
developed prior to passage of the current Copyright Act;57 and that
courts have interpreted the Copyright Act to include directories as
copyrightable subject matter.58
Rural correctly noted that telephone directories have been and
remain the proper subject matter of copyright. Feist, however, did
not argue that telephone directories were uncopyrightable. Feist
did argue that in order to qualify for copyright protection a tele-
phone directory must meet the statutory requirements of Section
101.' 9 Rural argued that its white pages met the statutory require-
ments of collection, selection, and arrangement such that their tele-
phone directory constituted an original work of authorship. 60
In support of their arguments, both Feist and Rural appealed
53. Feist Brief, supra note 31, at 15. The Supreme Court adopted Feist's interpretation
of § 101 almost verbatim. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1293.
54. Feist Brief, supra note 31, at 18.
55. Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 9-10. The Supreme Court did not dispute that "[t]he
standard of originality is low," but noted that "it does exist." Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296.
56. Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 11-13.
57. Id. at 13-17.
58. Id. at 17-22.
59. Feist Reply Brief, supra note 32, at 4.
60. Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 17-18.
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to the three then-existing theories of copyright protection for com-
pilations developed under the case law: the arrangement theory, the
labor or "sweat of the brow" theory, and the selection theory. Feist
emphasized the arrangement theory.61 Rural emphasized the labor
theory,62 and to a lesser degree, the selection theory.63 The Supreme
Court flatly rejected the labor theory as inconsistent with the origi-
nality standard set out by Congress." Instead, the Court reiterated
the statutory test of originality as shown by arrangement and selec-
tion.6' The following sections of this Comment examine the ar-
rangement, labor or "sweat of the brow," and selection theories as
argued and applied in Feist.
1. The Arrangement Theory
Courts have often found that the arrangement of information
in a compilation shows sufficient originality to invoke copyright
protection. The arrangement refers to the actual physical grouping
of the information in the required tangible medium of expression.
The arrangement theory has roots in both the case law66 and the
Copyright Act.67
The arrangement theory is important because in many cases
the arrangement of information in a purely factual compilation is
the only identifiable element of originality. However, the scope of
protection under the arrangement theory is very limited: only the
wholesale copying of a compilation's arrangement is likely to be
considered an infringement. Otherwise, even minimal variations to
61. Feist Brief, supra note 31, at 21-22; Feist Reply Brief, supra note 32, at 8.
62. For example, Rural cited Schroeder v. William Morrow Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir.
1977) extensively. Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 19-20. The bulk of Rural's argument focused
on the labor theory of compilations. Id. at 27-42.
63. Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 18.
64. "Without a doubt, the 'sweat of the brow' doctrine flouted basic copyright princi-
ples." Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1292.
65. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1295.
66. "[A] telephone directory compilation whose components are comprised exclusively
of information in the public domain can be protected by copyright law only as to the selection
and arrangement of the compilation .... " Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel.
Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801, 810 (11th Cir. 1985).
In a case where the defendant copied from and published an index to the plaintiff's own
index, the court, applying a fair use analysis, held that the plantiff would not likely succeed
on the merits of its copyright infringement claim because the defendant had not copied the
plaintiff's arrangement. "Defendants... neither have copied the correlated data along with
the personal names nor seek to publish a virtually identical index which would be in direct
competition with the Times Index. . . . Defendants rather extracted the names from the
multivolume Times Index and compiled their own alphabetical listing." New York Times,
Co. v. Roxbury Data Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 222-23 (D.N.J. 1977).
67. See supra text accompanying note 24.
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the arrangement of a copied compilation might not escape the in-
fringement label.68
a. The Arrangement Theory in Feist
For the white pages listings at issue in Feist, the arrangement
theory at best provides copyright protection which prohibits only
the exact duplication of the arrangement of the particular telephone
listings. However, the highly standardized arrangement of tele-
phone directories may preclude copyright protection altogether as
there would appear to be no originality in duplicating the standard
arrangement of a telephone directory.6 9 This conclusion is probably
restricted to compilations such as white pages listings which merely
list, in alphabetical order, the names, addresses, and phone numbers
of telephone subscribers. In Feist, the amicus curiae brief filed by
the trade associations whose members produce electronic compila-
tions noted these familiar characteristics of white pages.70
Feist argued that the arrangement of its white pages differed
significantly from Rural's arrangement, and that in any event an
alphabetical listing is an unprotectable idea.7 1 Rural strongly criti-
cized Feist's arrangement theory as permitting verbatim copying of
a compilation if its arrangement were not original. 72 This is the logi-
cal conclusion under the arrangement theory. Copyright protects
only original works of authorship. However, Rural overstated the
effect of the arrangement theory when it argued that Feist's ap-
proach would eliminate copyright protection for almanacs, diction-
68. Denicola, supra note 1, at 528.
69. This observation has been made in a copyright infringement suit over printed office
leasing guides. The court concluded that the standardized arrangement of highly factual
works precluded a finding of substantial similarity between the plaintiff's and defendant's
guides. Black's Guide, Inc. v. Mediamerica, Inc., No. C-90-0819, 1990 WL 169141, at *4-5,
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 1990). The court noted that factual works by their nature permit a
narrow range of possible arrangements. With respect to the two leasing guides at issue, the
court found that similarities between the guides such as stacked columns and common infor-
mation such as building names and available rental space were "inevitable" and thus pre-
cluded a copyright infringement action. Black's Guide, 1990 WL 169141, at *5.
Rural dismissed Black's Guide as in conflict with prior decisions and inapplicable be-
cause it was not about telephone directories. Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 22 n.12. The
Supreme Court in Feist adopted reasoning similar to Black's Guide but without citing to that
case. See Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296-97.
70. The trade associations noted three common characteristics of white pages: (1) all
white pages have the same type of contents organized in a nearly identical, alphabetized
manner; (2) the local telephone company obtains the white pages listings as a byproduct of
providing telephone service; and (3) the local telephone company is often required to publish
a directory of all whites pages listings. IIA/ADAPSO Brief, supra note 3, at 10-11.
71. Feist Reply Brief, supra note 32, at 8; Feist Brief, supra note 31, at 22.
72. Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 34.
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aries, credit reports, and reference works of all kinds.7 3 For
example, almanacs rarely use an identical format and arrangement.
What makes individual almanacs useful is how they arrange and
present their respective information. To the extent that almanacs
use different, original arrangements, they would be protected under
the arrangement theory. Dictionaries, on the other hand, are more
like white pages in that they must appear in a standard, alphabet-
ized arrangement. Thus, under the arrangement theory a dictionary
would be unprotectable. Yet dictionaries, like almanacs, credit re-
ports, and other reference works, and unlike white pages listings,
feature much copyrightable expression in their descriptions and ex-
planations. This expression would be copyrightable regardless of the
arrangement of the compilation.
The Supreme Court in Feist was unconvinced that Rural's
white pages listings showed sufficient originality.74 According to the
Court, merely listing names and addresses in alphabetical order
lacked any trace of creativity sufficient to make the arrangement of
Rural's white pages original.7" The highly standardized nature of
the arrangement of white pages undermined Rural's originality
claim to such a degree that no amount of argument could otherwise
convince the Court. The Court noted "[g]iven that some works
must fail, we cannot imagine a more likely candidate [than Rural's
white pages]. Indeed, were we to hold that Rural's white pages pass
73. Id.
74. At oral argument, after Rural's counsel explained how Rural selected and alphabet-
ized its listings, Justice Kennedy remarked that "I'm not stunned by the originality so far."
Transcript, supra note 32, at 34. Ironically, Rural's counsel then proceeded to define original-
ity in terms of the arrangement theory. "What makes [compilations] original is how the au-
thor arranges that information . . . ." Id. at 35. Rural's counsel returned to his standard
argument against the arrangement theory shortly afterwards, however. Id. at 48.
Justice Stevens also addressed the standardized format of a telephone directory. He
noted that a telephone directory must be published alphabetically, otherwise it would fail to
serve the needs of most people. Id. at 45. Justice Souter questioned the arrangement theory
on a more fundamental ground. He read the word "material" in Section 103(b) of the Copy-
right Act to imply content, not order. Id. at 53. See also supra text accompanying note 26.
75. Nor can Rural claim originality in its... arrangement of facts. The white
pages do nothing more than list Rural's subscribers in alphabetical order. This
arrangement may, technically speaking, owe its origin to Rural; no one dis-
putes that Rural undertook the task of alphabetizing the names itself. But there
is nothing remotely creative about arranging names alphabetically in a white
pages directory. It is an age-old practice, firmly rooted in tradition and so com-
monplace that it has come to be expected as a matter of course. ... It is not
only unoriginal, it is practically inevitable. This time-honored tradition does
not possess the minimal creative spark required by the Copyright Act and the
Constitution.
Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1297.
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muster, it is hard to believe that any collection of facts could fail."76
2. The Labor or "Sweat of the Brow" Theory
Courts have often granted copyright protection based solely on
the compiler's efforts, in order to protect the compiler's investment
of time and money expended in creating a compilation. Under the
labor or 'sweat of the brow" theory, a court finds sufficient original-
ity as long as the compiler independently collected the information
for his compilation without directly copying it from another copy-
righted compilation. In sharp contrast to the arrangement theory,
the labor theory protects a compilation regardless of its arrange-
ment. A major criticism of the labor theory is that it extends copy-
right protection to individual facts.7 7
Unlike the arrangement theory which has an identifiable basis
in the Copyright Act,78 the labor theory is at best obliquely sup-
ported by Section 101's reference to "collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data." In addition, the language of Sec-
tion 103(b)79 seems to preclude the labor theory from coypyright
protection. Despite its weak statutory support, the labor theory is
amply supported in the case law and has been very popular with
courts, particularly those in the Seventh and Eight Circuits. Its pop-
ularity stems from intuitive notions about rewarding a person's
hard work.80
A foundational case for the labor theory is the 1922 decision in
Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co. made
by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. The Jeweler's Cir-
cular court upheld a copyright infringement claim against the de-
fendant for copying the plaintiff's directory of trademarks used by
76. Id.
77. Gorman, supra note 1, at 573. Defenders of the labor theory correctly seek a compi-
lation theory more substantial than the easily circumvented arrangement theory. See Den-
icola, supra note 1, at 530. Yet the arguments of other defenders that the labor theory does
not protect facts in uncopyrighted sources or facts collected through personal effort ignores
the practical problem of access to these facts. Note, supra note 15, at 1009-10. Many facts,
such as stock quotes and telephone numbers-are only available from a single source. A labor
theory could give copyright protection resembling a monopoly to these sources.
78. See supra text accompanying note 24.
79. "The copyright in a compilation.., extends only to the material contributed by the
author .... 17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (emphasis added). The word material implies substance, not
labor or effort. See also infra text accompanying notes 93-97.
80. "The effort of authorship can be effectively encouraged and rewarded only by link-
ing the existence and extent of protection to the total labor of production.... [To do other-
wise would be] to ignore the central contribution of the compiler." Denicola, supra note 1, at
530.
81. 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
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jewelers and distributing its own competing directory. The court
relied on the compiler's industrious collection of the data for its
compilation as the basis for copyright protection. 2
Fifteen years after Jeweler's Circular, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed the Jeweler's Circular reasoning in
Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telephone Co. 3 The Leon court found
that the defendant had infringed the plaintiff's copyright in its San
Francisco Bay Area telephone directories. The defendant copied the
listings from the plaintiff's directory and then inverted the listings
in its own directory so that it was organized by telephone number
and not by name. Leon reaffirmed the labor theory of Jeweler's Cir-
cular by citing several English cases which focused on the original
compiler's labor and expense.8 4 Recent cases also adopted the labor
theory to protect an original compiler's labor and investment from
infringement.85
a. The Labor or "Sweat of the Brow" Theory in
Feist
Feist disputed the cases which followed the labor theory. Feist
cited courts which had rejected the labor theory and argued that the
labor theory impermissibly protected individual facts.8 6 Feist also
argued that under the statutory definition of compilations in Section
101 of the Copyright Act labor was not an element of originality
which could invoke copyright protection. 7 Rural responded by ar-
guing that the cases following the labor theory - spanning nearly
seventy years since the 1922 Jeweler's Circular decision - estab-
lished the labor theory standard for copyright protection in compi-
82. The man who goes through the streets of a town and puts down the name of
each of the inhabitants, with their occupations and their street number[s], ac-
quires material of which he is the author. He produces by his labor a meritori-
ous composition, in which he may obtain a copyright, and thus the exclusive
right of multiplying copies of his work.
a d at 88.
83. 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937).
84. Id. at 487.
85. See, ag., Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Haines and Co., 905 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir.
1990) ("Everyone must do the same basic work, the same 'industrious collection.' A subse-
quent compiler is bound to set about doing for himself what the first compiler has done."),
vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1408 (1991); Rockford Map Publishers, Inc. v. Directory Serv. Co., 768
F.2d 145, 149 (7th Cir. 1985) ("The second compiler must assemble the material as if there
had never been a first compilation .... "), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986); Schroeder v.
William Morrow & Co., 566 F.2d 3, 5 (7th Cir. 1977) ("[O]nly 'industrious collection,' not
originality in the sense of novelty, is required.").
86. Feist Brief, supra note 31, at 15-18. See also supra note 43.
87. For Feist's interpretation of the § 101 requirements for a compilation, see supra text
accompanying note 53.
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lations under both the Copyright Act of 190988 and the current
1976 Copyright Act.8 9 Rural also supported the labor theory on the
policy grounds that no compilation is produced without labor and
thus protection for labor is one ingredient which maintains the in-
centive to produce factual compilations. 90 Neither Feist nor Rural
questioned the premise that labor alone was insufficient to justify
copyright protection for a compilation.91
Despite Rural's best efforts in arguing for the labor theory,
both legal and practical arguments in Feist led to the theory's ulti-
mate demise. For example, during the oral arguments in Feist, Jus-
tice Souter made a particularly interesting analysis of Section
103(b)92 of the Copyright Act which indicated that the language of
the Copyright Act may preclude the labor theory altogether. Jus-
tice Souter focused on the word "material," reading it to mean that
content is the touchstone for protection, not the process or effort of
compilation.93 Rural's counsel replied that the material contributed
by Rural in its white pages listings was its "hard work or labor." 94
Justice Souter persisted in distinguishing "material" from "hard
work or labor", but further examination of what "material" means
in the context of Section 103(b) was not pursued.95 Justice Souter's
point is well-taken. The legislative history for Section 103(b) is si-
lent on the material-effort distinction, but emphasizes that the
Copyright Act of 1976 more sharply defines the line between preex-
isting and new material than the previous Copyright Act of 1909.
The legislative history uses the word "material" and makes no ref-
erence to any other criteria for protection in a compilation.9 6 There-
fore, Congress thought it sufficient to use the word "material" in
88. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 5(a), 35 Stat. 1076 (1909).
89. See Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 25-28.
90. Rural does not (and the courts below certainly did not) contend that effort
alone, in the absence of originality, warrants copyright protection. Granted
that directories are 'original works of authorship,' the policies of the [Copy-
right] Act provide that copyright protection sweeps broadly enough to en-
courage the 'industrious collection' that is necessarily required for the creation
of any compilation.
Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 39.
91. Feist Brief, supra note 31, at 16-17; Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 32.
92. See supra text accompanying note 26.
93. Transcript, supra note 32, at 51. "[My suggestion is that material implies some-
thing about the content of the work rather than something about the effort that goes into
producing the work." Id at 52.
94. Id
95. Id at 53-54.
96. "The most important point here is one that is commonly misunderstood today:
copyright in a 'new version' covers only the material added by the later author, and has no
effect one way or the other on the copyright or public domain status of the preexisting mate-
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Section 103(b) without making any reference to effort or labor. Ac-
cepting the premise that Congress meant what it said in Section
103(b) - that "material" was used in its ordinary sense of sub-
stance or content - then it would appear that copyright protection
for compilations extends only to the content provided by the com-
piler, not to his effort or hard work."7
Other legal analysis also doomed the labor theory. Feist noted
that the labor theory had been rejected by several circuits.98 Most
importantly, the Ninth Circuit, the circuit in which the landmark
labor theory case of Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telephone Co.99
was decided, rejected Leon's reasoning to the extent that labor is the
defining characteristic of originality for compilations."° The Ninth
Circuit rejected the reasoning of Leon because it felt that the labor
theory caused unnecessary duplication of effort - in opposition to
the policy of copyright law.' The Second Circuit has also rejected
the labor theory as restricting public access to information. 2
Clearly, the labor theory was not as universally embraced as Rural's
rial." H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 57 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5670 (emphasis added).
97. If state common law copyright had extended protection to labor or effort, then that
protection was expressly preempted by Section 301(a) of the 1976 Copyright Act:
[A]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of
authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within
the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103 ... are
governed exclusively by this title.
17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1988) (emphasis added). Although the labor theory cases advanced by
Rural were decided under federal copyright law, § 301(a) adds some additional support to the
notion that the "material" standard of § 103(b) is the sole standard for determining the copy-
rightable contribution of a compiler.
98. Feist Brief, supra note 31, at 16-18.
99. 91 F.2d 484 (9th Cir. 1937). See also supra text accompanying notes 81, 83.
100. Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 977 (1988) ("['1o the extent that Leon suggests that research or labor is protectible
[sic], later cases have rejected that theory."); Black's Guide, Inc. v. Mediamerica, Inc., 1990
WL 169141, at *4, (N.D. Cal. Aug. 15 1990) ("It is clear from subsequent cases, however,
that the rationale which was behind the Leon decision.., more recently has been rejected, at
least insofar as it involves the appropriation of labor and skill.")
101. We... cannot subscribe to the view that an author is absolutely precluded
from saving time and effort by referring to and relying upon prior published
material .... It is just such wasted effort that the proscription against the
copyright of ideas and facts, and to a lesser extent the privilege of fair use, are
designed to protect.
Worth, 827 F.2d at 574.
102. The statute thus requires that copyrightability not be determined by the
amount of effort the author expends, but rather by the nature of the final result.
To grant copyright protection merely on the "sweat of the author's brow"
would risk putting large areas of factual research material ofil-]limits and
threaten the public's unrestrained access to information.
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arguments implied.1"3
On a practical level, the labor theory does not make sense as
applied to the white pages in Feist. Rural procured the white pages
listings in the regular course of its business. Rural did not make an
independent canvass to gather the listings,"°4 so why must Feist
travel door-to-door asking customers for their phone numbers and
addresses? Feist noted that an independent canvass covering 46,000
telephone subscribers spread out over 16,000 square miles in rural
Kansas was economically unfeasible.10 The constitutional provi-
sion creating federal copyright law speaks in terms of promoting
progress, 10 6 not making subsequent authors retrace the exact foot-
steps of their predecessors. 107
b. The End of the Labor or "Sweat of the Brow"
Theory
The Supreme Court in Feist rejected the labor theory as incon-
sistent with the language of the Copyright Act and, more funda-
mentally, with its underlying policies. The Court agreed that it may
appear unfair that a compiler's efforts may be copied freely by an-
other, but noted that the constitutional objective of copyright law is
to promote the progress of the sciences and arts.108
Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 808 F.2d 204, 207 (2d Cir.
1986), cerL denied, 484 U.S. 820 (1987).
103. Rural did not cite in its Brief either of the Ninth or Second Circuit cases that re-
jected the labor theory.
104. Rural brushed over this point and concluded that the listings in the white pages
were "collected, assembled, selected, arranged, and coordinated by Rural." Rural Brief, supra
note 31, at 18 n.10. See also Feist Brief, supra note 31, at 11.
105. Feist Brief, supra note 31, at 10. In lieu of getting a license from Rural to use its
white pages listings, Feist went so far as to verify the listings it had copied. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at
1286-87.
106. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
107. See supra note 102.
108. It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor may be
used by others without compensation.... [Tihis is not "some unforeseen by-
product of a statutory scheme."... It is, rather, "the essence of copyright," ...
and a constitutional requirement. The primary objective of copyright is not to
reward the labor of authors, but "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts." . . . To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their
original expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and
information conveyed by a work .... This principle, known as the idea/expres-
sion or fact/expression dichotomy, applies to all works of authorship. As ap-
plied to a factual compilation, assuming the absence of original written
expression, only the compiler's selection and arrangement may be protected;
the raw facts may be copied at will. This result is neither unfair nor unfortu-
nate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and
art.
SDATA BSES 4ND FEIST
The Supreme Court viewed the labor theory as the result of
many courts losing sight of the implied originality requirement in
the 1909 Copyright Act. Rather than look for the required original-
ity in factual compilations, these labor theory courts read the
enumeration of "directories" as the proper subject matter of copy-
right in the 1909 statute to mean that all directories were automati-
cally copyrightable. 1 9 Apparently, these labor theory courts were
not content with this approach alone so they developed the "sweat
of the brow" or "industrious collection" approach to reward the
hard work of compilers of factual works.110 The Court noted that of
the many problems with the labor theory, its most glaring flaw was
to extend protection in a compilation beyond a compiler's original
selection and arrangement to the facts themselves.' 1 Finally, the
Court indicated that the 1976 Copyright Act was written to remove
the confusion surrounding copyrightability by making the original-
ity requirement explicit in Section 102(a)' 2 and by re-writing the
requirements for compilations in general.' 13
The reasons given by the Court for rejecting the labor theory
are readily acceptable on their face. However, several questions lin-
ger as to whether the Court's analysis convincingly dispenses with
the labor theory. The Court read the ambiguity over originality in
the 1909 Copyright Act as causing lower courts to temporarily lose
sight of the originality requirement." 4 But these courts lost their
sights for nearly seventy years, beginning with the 1922 Jeweler's
Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co. "5 decision. Fur-
ther, courts continued to adhere to the labor theory for the thirteen
years following the January 1, 1978 effective date" 6 of the 1976
Copyright Act. The Court also indicated that the 1976 Copyright
Act was drafted to maintain the established standards of originality
developed since the 1909 Act. 117 But the Court never cited an au-
thority to refute the idea that Congress may have implicitly recog-
Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1289-90 (citations omitted).
109. Id. at 1290-91.
110. Id. at 1291.
111. Id. ("Under the [labor theory] doctrine, the only defense to infringement was in-
dependent creation"). The Court cited its 1918 decision in International News Serv. v. Associ-
ated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918) as an example which makes clear that the 1909 Copyright Act
did not support the labor theory. The Feist Court likened the factual news events in Interna-
tional News, which were not copyrightable, to the factual information in Feist. Id. at 1292.
112. Id. at 1292-93.
113. Id. at 1293-94.
114. Id. at 1291.
115. 281 F. 83 (2d Cir. 1922), cert denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922).
116. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304 (1988).
117. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1292-93.
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nized the labor theory as a valid, albeit judicially-developed,
standard for originality in compilations. Of course, had Congress
acquiesced to the labor theory at some point, it seems likely that at
least one Justice would have pointed this out in Feist. But Feist was
a 9-0 unanimous decision with Justice Blackmun concurring in the
judgment (without writing separately). It appears that the Supreme
Court simply viewed the labor theory as an obvious mistake in need
of correction.
3. The Selection Theory
A less frequently-used compilation theory focuses on the selec-
tion and judgment made by the compiler in choosing information
for his compilation. Under the selection theory, the originality re-
quirement is met by the compiler's exercise of his judgment and
discretion in selecting information." 8 Like the labor theory, the se-
lection theory is process-oriented in that the focus is on the actions
of the compiler. Unlike the labor theory, the selection theory grants
copyright protection based on the compiler's discretion as to what
information will be useful in the compilation, not based on the com-
piler's labor.
The selection theory is reflected in the Copyright Act through
the references in Section 101 to collected materials that are selected
or coordinated so as to produce a copyrightable compilation. This
theory is also reflected in case law: copyright protection based on
selection has been found for yellow pages advertising, 119 a list of
baseball cards,120 the choice of stocks in a stock index,12' a list of
restaurants serving good food, 22 and a list of names for a social
register.123
Most applications of the selection theory have been to small
collections of information, perhaps because of a perception that
compilers exercise more original selection when creating small com-
pilations than they do when creating large, comprehensive compila-
tions.124 However, the size of the collection of data is not indicative
118. Gorman, supra note 1, at 572 n.30.
119. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801,
810 (11th Cir. 1985).
120. Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1984).
121. Dow Jones & Co. v. Chicago Bd. of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113, 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1982)
(but finding fair use by defendant).
122. Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 809, 812-13
(7th Cir. 1942).
123. List Publishing Co. v. Keller, 30 F. 772, 773-74 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1887).
124. Note, supra note 15, at 1006.
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of the compiler's original selection. The judgment and discretion
used to select information for a large compilation may be equal in
quality, but not in quantity, to that used to compile a small collec-
tion. 125 The compiler's original selection occurs when he designs his
compilation and determines the types of information he will include
in it. The process of collecting and updating the information in a
compilation merely reflects the implementation of the compiler's
design and not his original selection.
a. The Selection Theory in Feist
Feist defined selection as the exercise of judgment in deciding
which facts to copy from a given source of information.1 26 Feist
then contended that Rural did not select the items for its white
pages listings: Rural merely reproduced the alphabetical listings for
all of its telephone subscribers. 127 Feist concluded that because Ru-
ral exhibited no selection, Rural's white pages did not qualify for
copyright protection as a compilation.128 To a degree, Feist's argu-
ment that Rural exhibited no selection mirrors the criticisms of the
arrangement theory as applied to telephone directories: 129 Rural
simply printed the listings for each of its telephone subscribers as
required by law.130
In reply, Rural argued that Feist's selection theory "would
have the perverse effect of encouraging compilers to make their
works less inclusive - and therefore less useful - so that they
could claim to have exercised 'selection' in their choice of data." '31
Rural read Feist's selection argument to mean that the publisher of
all facts from a particular set of data would exhibit less selection
than the publisher of a subset. This is a fair reading of what Feist
proposed and raises an important question about the selection the-
ory in general. In fact, Feist likened compiling all facts from a col-
lection of data to mere labor, not copyrightable selection. 132
Feist had the right idea about selection but it muddied the wa-
ters by likening the compilation of all facts to labor. Feist should
have recognized that selection - as the exercise of a compiler's
judgment and discretion in choosing facts - might require the
125. See Id. at 1006-07.
126. Feist Reply Brief, supra note 32, at 7.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 7 & n.5, 8.
129. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
130. Feist Reply Brief, supra note 32, at 7.
131. Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 35 (footnote omitted).
132. Feist Reply Brief, supra note 32, at 8-9.
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compiler to include all facts from a particular source of data.133 For
example, a compiler of baseball trading card prices must include an
entry for each card issued in a particular baseball season if the com-
piler wishes to serve the general baseball card collector. The com-
piler's selection is shown by his decision to serve a particular
collector and tailor his compilation to include the values of all base-
ball trading cards. Similarly, the same compiler who wishes to serve
collectors interested solely in American League players would com-
pile only players from that league. Again, the compiler has exer-
cised his judgment by tailoring his compilation to the needs of his
target user.
131
The Supreme Court accepted Feist's contention that Rural's
"selection" of listings for its white pages exhibited no originality
sufficient to invoke copyright protection. 135 Rural was further un-
dermined by its status as the telephone company and by the very
nature of white pages. As the local telephone company directed by
state law to produce white pages, the Court found that in some
sense state law, not Rural, was responsible for the selection in its
directory.136 Further, the highly generic nature of the whites pages
themselves precluded any originality on Rural's part.137
Because the Supreme Court viewed the originality standard as
being very low, 3 8 the Court's approach to the selection theory
133. At oral argument, Justice Scalia rejected the claim of Feist's attorney that compil-
ing a list of a whole range of data is not selection:
When you say select the whole range of data, you're begging the question. I
mean, deciding what the range is is itself a selection. You can decide to publish
all the restaurants in town or you can decide to publish just the 100 best restau-
rants. But either one is a selection.
Transcript, supra note 32, at 14.
134. Cf Rural Brief, supra note 31, at 35 n.20; Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d
859, 862-63 (2d Cir. 1984).
135. The selection.., of Rural's white pages do not satisfy the minimum consti-
tutional standards for copyright protection.... In preparing its white pages,
Rural simply takes the data provided by its subscribers and lists it alphabeti-
cally by surname. The end product is a garden-variety white pages directory,
devoid of even the slightest trace of creativity.
Rural's selection of listings could not be more obvious: it publishes the
most basic information-name, town, and telephone number-about each per-
son who applies to it for telephone service. This is "selection" of a sort, but it
lacks the modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection into
copyrightable expression. Rural expended sufficient effort to make the white
pages directory useful, but insufficient creativity to make it original.
Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1296.
136. Id. at 1296-97.
137. "Rural's white pages are entirely typical." Id. at 1296.
138. "To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount
will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some
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would protect compilations of all but the most generic, standard-
ized works. In other words, as long as a compiler does not create a
work on par with a white pages telephone directory139 his compila-
tion is likely to win copyright protection. Thus, even selecting "all"
of the facts for a particular collection of information would appear
to invoke copyright protection under the selection theory.
1
'
4
V. THE SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION IN ELECTRONIC
DATA BASES UNDER FEIST PUBLICATION,% INC v. RURAL
TELEPHONE SER vicE. Co.
Electronic data bases are sources of great economic value to
their compilers.1 41  It is thus no surprise that the Feist decision
raised eyebrows as to the scope of copyright protection in electronic
compilations.142 By jettisoning the labor theory, the Supreme Court
eliminated the one compilation theory which offered protection to
compilers for their investment of time and money in compiling eco-
nomically and socially useful, but decidedly unoriginal, factual
compilations. Under Feist, these same compilers must now show
originality in the arrangement or selection of their works.
It is much easier for a compiler to show evidence of his hard
work and investment to satisfy the labor theory than to demonstrate
his originality in compiling a highly factual, highly standardized
compilation. But the Supreme Court in Feist recognized this di-
lemma by reiterating the very low threshold of originality required
in the arrangement or selection of a compilation in order to invoke
copyright protection.1 43 As this Comment demonstrates, the pro-
creative spark, 'no matter how crude, humble or obvious' it might be." Id. at 1287 (citations
omitted).
139. See supra text accompanying note 76.
140. Originality requires only that the author make the selection... indepen-
dently (i.e., without copying that selection or arrangement from another work),
and that it display some minimal level of creativity. Presumably, the vast ma-
jority of compilations will pass this test, but not all will There remains a narrow
category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to
be virtually nonexistent
Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1294 (emphasis added).
141. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
142. "David Lange, a copyright specialist[,] ... said the decision might prove 'revolu-
tionary for the information industry,' with the double-edged result of making information
more widely available to the public and at the same time diminishing the economic value of
data bases that are essentially compilations of facts." Linda Greenhouse, Copyright Protection
Limited, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1991, at Cl. The general counsel for the Information Industry
Association trade group said the Feist decision would make compilers think twice about mak-
ing the investment to compile a factual data base. Id.
143. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1294.
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cess of creating and compiling an electronic data base involves suffi-
cient selection which would be likely to clear the originality hurdle
to secure copyright protection for many factual data bases. Given
the Court's view of the white pages as the lowest common denomi-
nator of printed compilations, 144 it is likely that most electronic
data bases will show sufficient originality in selection, and possibly
even arrangement, to warrant copyright protection under Feist.1 45
A. The Differences Between Printed and Electronic
Compilations of Facts
Before a compilation of facts is published in either a printed
form or in an electronic data base, the compilation reflects the de-
veloper's organization and selection of facts collected from many
different sources. Once published, however, there are important dis-
tinctions between printed and electronic compilations.1 46 Printed
compilations can be perceived by the unaided eye while electronic
data bases can only be perceived by a person through the use of a
computer and data base software. Printed compilations are frozen
in their appearance on the page and the success or failure of these
compilations is determined by the usefulness of their fixed arrange-
ment. By contrast, electronic data bases permit their users to rear-
range information and display subsets of infoimation through the
use of data base software. 147 Finally, unlike static printed compila-
tions, electronic data bases are dynamic: their contents are updated
144. See supra text accompanying note 76.
145. Because of the generic characteristics of white pages, the trade associations repre-
senting electronic data base compilers argued that Feist was an inappropriate opportunity for
the Supreme Court to fashion a general compilation rule. IIA/ADAPSO Brief, supra note 3,
at 10. Clearly, the trade associations feared that a general rule derived from a white pages
case might underprotect electronic data bases.
The trade associations noted that few other commercially important data bases would
reflect all of the common characteristics of white pages listings. Data bases covering similar
subjects may vary in their format, presentation, flexibility, and depth. The amicus brief offers
the example of a financial data base. One company's data base may include only "bid and
ask" prices for stocks while a competitor's data base may add information such as financial
reports, 52 week highs and lows, and other statistical analysis. The brief argues that the value
of commercial data bases lies in how they bring together relevant information from a variety
of sources. Id. at 12. Under Feist, this argument would mirror the selection theory.
146. Note, supra note 15, at 1013.
147. The data in an electronic data base is organized into a fixed arrangement but this
grouping is only relevant to the computer programmer who adds or removes information
from the data base. From the perspective of a data base user, this internal arrangement is
usually irrelevant. A data base is useful not because of the internal arrangement of its infor-
mation but because a user can rearrange and manipulate the information to suit her needs. In
certain situations, a data base user may notice the consequences of a particular internal ar-
rangement of information which may affect the data base's utility. For example, a data base
which stores information based on the frequency with which it is requested by users may be
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with current information and purged of obsolete information. In
large part, the success of a data base is determined as much by the
flexibility it permits in rearranging data as it is by the types of infor-
mation it includes and the comprehensiveness of its particular com-
pilation of facts.14
B. Electronic Data Bases under the Copyright.Act of 1976
Congress established the National Commission on New Tech-
nological Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU") in 1974 to ad-
dress the copyright issues raised by computer and photocopier
technology. As part of its mission, CONTU examined copyright in
computer data bases. 149 Although Congress did not explicitly adopt
the CONTU Final Report as legislative history, commentators and
courts have referred to CONTU's report for guidance with com-
puter-related copyright questions.
The CONTU Final Report recognized that computer data ba-
ses were merely older, printed compilations dressed up in new, elec-
tronic clothes. As such, CONTU viewed computer data bases as
protectable compilations under the Copyright Act.1 50 CONTU
framed its view of the policy underlying copyright protection for
computer data bases in familiar terms of creating incentives
balanced against widespread public access to electronic
compilations. 51
frustratingly slow for a user who is interested in obscure, rarely-requested facts. See id at
1014.
148. Id
149. Denicola, supra note 1, at 531 & n.74.
150. "Under the new law, a data base is a compilation and thus a proper subject for
copyright." National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final
Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 38
(1978) [hereinafter CONTU Final Report].
Citing to Section 102(a) of the Copyright Act, the CONTU Final Report also noted that
the electromagnetic fixation of a computer data base met the fixation requirements for copy-
right protection.
This entitlement to copyright is not diminished by the fixation of the data base
in a medium requiring the intervention of a computer.... Accordingly, a data
base, whether printed in traditional hard copy or fixed in an electromagnetic
medium, is protected by copyright under the terms of the new law.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
151. "Copyright applied to data bases should encourage the development and dissemina-
tion of useful stores of information to make this information readily available to the public."
Id. at 39.
CONTU also reiterated the basic principle that individual facts within a data base are
not protected by copyright:
Similar... to a telephone directory, copyright in a dynamic data base protects
no individual datum, but only the systematized form in which the data are
presented. The use of one item retrieved from such a work - be it an address,
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CONTU did not explicitly address the arrangement, labor, and
selection theories of compilations. Yet the CONTU Final Report
offers some insight into how the commissioners viewed the use of
information retrieved from a copyrighted data base. Initially, the
CONTU commissioners frowned upon the wholesale copying of in-
formation from a computer data base for a commercial purpose -
even if access to the data base was procured legally.152 The commis-
sioners next intimated that copyright in a data base lies in its "sys-
tematized form" which suggests protection based on either the
arrangement or selection theory. The commissioners, in adopting
the substantial similarity standard for copyright infringement of
data bases,15 a cited the infringement standards developed by the di-
rectory cases and cited to three cases which followed either the la-
bor or arrangement theories. 54
Because the CONTU Final Report failed to recommend a spe-
cific compilation theory to apply to computer data bases, and given
the report's inconsistent references to all three theories, the value of
the Final Report is limited. The Final Report offers little guidance
as to which compilation theory the commissioners thought best
suited to electronic data bases.
C. Creating an Electronic Data Base
Creating an electronic data base involves numerous decisions
a chemical formula, or a citation to an article - would not under reasonable
circumstances merit the attention of the copyright proprietor. Nor would it
conceivably constitute infringement of copyright.
Id. at 42.
152. Id. at 41.
153. "The retrieval and reduplication of any substantial portion of a data base, whether
or not the individual data are in the public domain, would likely constitute a duplication of
the copyrighted element of a data base and would be an infringement." Id. at 42.
The substantial similarity standard poses interesting problems for electronic data base
publishers. Many data bases are accessed over telephone lines or some other external commu-
nications link. Users of these data bases could copy small portions of a data base over time so
as to collect a substantial portion of the data base's information. Unless the data base vendor
monitors the usage of each customer closely, this kind of incremental copying of a substantial
amount of a data base could go unnoticed. Other data bases are accessed via transportable
mediums such as magnetic disks or optical CD-ROM disks. Monitoring the amount of infor-
mation copied from these kinds of sources is extremely difficult, if not impossible. See supra
text accompanying note 10.
154. CONTU Final Report at 42 n.171 (citing Leon v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 91 F.2d
484 (9th Cir. 1937); Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83
(2d Cir. 1922), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922); New York Times, Co. v. Roxbury Data
Interface, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 217, 222-23 (D.N.J. 1977)). Jeweler's Circular and Leon stressed
the labor theory. See supra text accompanying notes 82 & 84. New York Times focused on a
variant of the arrangement theory. See supra note 66.
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about its technical design, the degree of control built into its struc-
ture to accommodate the needs of different users, the scope of its
actual contents, and its sources of information. These decisions are
similar to those made by the compiler of a printed data base with
one important exception: the compiler of an electronic data base
must decide how to best implement the dynamic flexibility that dis-
tinguishes electronic data bases from static printed compilations.
The typical stages of data base development include (1) specifi-
cation of general requirements and goals; (2) evaluation of alterna-
tives; (3) design following the chosen alternative; and (4)
implementation of the design. 155 The specification stage is usually a
feasibility study coupled with an elaboration of the computer hard-
ware and software requirements for the proposed data base.15 6 The
evaluation stage determines the best approach for meeting the re-
quirements and goals of the data base users.1 57 During the final
stage, implementation, the data base project team writes and tests
the software program that creates and controls the data base. 158 The
implementation stage is the practical culmination of the conceptual
decisions made during the specification, evaluation, and design
stages.
Because the compilation theory of Feist focuses on arrange-
ment and selection, 15 9 the most interesting and important develop-
ment stage for electronic data bases is the design stage. It is during
the design stage of the data base that the compiler makes basic deci-
sions regarding, (1) the nature of the particular data base, (2) the
individual units of information in the data base and their relation-
ship to one another, and (3) the overall model for organizing the
data base and presenting it to the user. These decisions reflect how
the electronic data base compiler arranges and selects so as to create
a data base that meets the needs of its users.
There are several parts to the design stage, including these es-
pecially significant portions which bear directly on the information
stored within a data base.
The compiler first decides how information in the data base
will correspond to information in the real world. In other words,
the compiler determines the basic unit of information in the data
155. DAvID KROENKE, DATABASE PROCESSING: FUNDAMENTALS, DESIGN, IMPLE-
MENTATION 21 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter KROENKE].
156. Id. at 22-27. These requirements are often determined by contacting potential users
to understand their needs.
157. Id. at 27.
158. Id. at 40-41.
159. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
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base and how this unit is represented." e Traditionally, information
in a data base has been organized around the record."' A common
analogy to a data base record is a paper index card or file folder
holding a piece of information or an aggregation of pieces. The
compiler's use of the record, for example, reflects his selection of a
model for the information in the data base.'62 By its nature any
model imposes the compiler's artificial structure on the information
in the data base.163 Clearly, the best model for a data base is one
consistent with the expectations of data base users. Thus, a com-
piler's selection of a model may be the most important choice he
makes in the design stage.
Next, the compiler must account for change within the data
base. Specifically, the compiler must decide how to govern changes
to existing data and how to accommodate new information added to
the data base or derived from existing data.' The inevitability of
changes to a data base also means the compiler must design an
"elastic" structure that permits changes to occur with a minimum
of adverse effects on the data base.165
Perhaps most importantly for the selection theory, the com-
piler must select appropriate categories for the information in the
data base. The categorization of information for a data base must be
tailored for the specific system.166 For example, one data base of
lawyers practicing in the United States may include categories for
the name of a lawyer, her firm, and her firm's practice. Another
data base serving a different clientele may include both name cate-
gories, omit the practice category, and add information about the
firm's clients and representative cases. Still another data base may
include all of these categories plus new ones.
Categorization in a data base does not stop at the abstract
level. Categories may be sharpened at increasing levels of refine-
ment depending on the nature of the information in the data base
160. WILLIAM KENT, DATA AND REALITY: BASIC ASSUMPTIONS IN DATA PROCESS-
ING RECONSIDERED 1 (1978) [hereinafter Kent].
161. Id. at 36, 101-02. KROENKE, supra note 155, at 11-12, 182. By contrast, relational
data bases use tables, not records, as their basic organizing feature. C.J. DATE, DATABASE: A
PRIMER 249, 254 (1983).
162. KENT, supra note 160, at 93. "A model is a basic system of constructs used in
describing reality. It reflects a person's deepest assumptions regarding the elementary essence
of things. It may be called a 'world view.'" Id.
163. Id. at 94.
164. Id. at 8-11.
165. See generally, WILLIAM H. INMON, EFFECTIVE DATA BASE DESIGN 62-78 (Leo-
nard Krauss ed. 1981).
166. KENT, supra note 160, at 13.
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and its uses. 167 However, selecting the category in which informa-
tion belongs is not always clearcut: some categorizations are self-
evident while others are debatable and still others are purely arbi-
trary. In the end, a particular categorization ideally should reflect
the compiler's selection based on his recognition of what is most
meaningful and useful to the users of the data base.161 Part and
parcel of categorizing information is defining the relationships be-
tween different pieces of information.169
Finally, one level above identifying and classifying informa-
tion, a compiler must choose an appropriate description for each
piece of information. This normally involves predefining the charac-
teristics of information, such as the letters, numbers, or symbols
that are permitted in the description and the length of the descrip-
tion.'7 0 Selecting an appropriate description for the information in a
data base is critical not only for alerting users as to the appropriate
type and form for particular entries, but also for optimizing com-
puter storage and performance.1
7 1
D. Applying the Compilation Theories of Feist to Electronic
Data Bases
1. Protection Under the Arrangement Theory
The arrangement theory invokes copyright protection based on
originality in the physical layout of information in a compilation.172
The Court in Feist was prepared to recognize originality in any ar-
rangement as long as it exhibited enough creativity to distinguish it
from a generic, standardized arrangement. 73 For electronic data
bases, the arrangement theory provides very limited copyright pro-
tection, perhaps prohibiting only the exact copying of the actual
magnetic or other medium for storing a data base. At a technical
level, invisible to most users, a data base possesses a physical ar-
rangement that reflects the technical design and skill of the software
engineer who designed the data base. This physical arrangement of
a data base would qualify for copyright protection under the ar-
167. Id.
168. "Then the notions of category ... have to be reexamined ... to arrive at a set
meaningful to all users." Id at 14.
169. Id at 63.
170. Id at 23. Kent identifies three levels of description: the multiple views level as seen
by the user, the physical layout level of data stored internally by the data base, and the
conceptual level which specifies the content of information in the data base. Id. at 25-26.
171. Id. at 25.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
173. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
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rangement theory if it met the originality requirement. 174 Thus, a
data base user who copies an entire data base from a magnetic or
optical CD-ROM disk could be a copyright infringer if the data
base qualifies for protection.1 75
Beyond literal, bit-for-bit copying of a data base, the arrange-
ment theory provides little copyright protection against infringers
who simply rearrange the facts in a data base before copying them.
Presumably, the rearranged facts would be as worthwhile to the
copier as the facts would be in their original arrangement. Thus, by
exploiting the inherent flexibility of data bases, a user could easily
avoid infringement even when copying an entire data base of facts.
This would be a perverse result because it turns the most useful
characteristic of data bases into the very tool used to escape copy-
right infringement. One commentator noted that the technical skill
of data base users might be a practical bar against rearranging the
facts in a data base to escape infringement. 176 It is true that a tech-
nically unsophisticated data base user might not be able to rear-
range the facts in a complicated or heavily protected data base.
However, the proliferation of easy to use "front ends" or user inter-
faces makes accessing and rearranging the facts in many once im-
penetrable data bases a simple matter of selecting a few commands.
As the search programs for data bases become easier to use, the
technical skill of a data base user will likely disappear as a potential
bar for discouraging copyright infringement. As a result, under the
arrangement theory the publishers of copyrightable data bases may
be able to rely on little more than the promises of their users not to
rearrange and copy the contents of a data base for commercial
use. 177
174. Note, supra note 15, at 1022-23. As such, Professor Denicola's statement that com-
puter data bases have "no particular arrangement to protect" is not technically accurate.
However, his conclusion that data bases should be protected as "assemblage[s] of informa-
tion" may have merit if he means something beyond the ordinary arrangement theory. See
Denicola, supra note 1, at 531.
175. Copying in this instance could be shown through the substantial similarity between
the original and copied data bases and the data base user's access to the original data base.
See supra note 18.
176. Note, supra note 15, at 1023.
177. The best solution for data base publishers may be a licensing agreement with each
data base user. Professor Ginsburg argues that compulsory licensing may be an appropriate
solution. Under one of her proposals, a license would permit its holder to make a complete,
identical copy of the licensed data base. Of course, the license holder would pay for this
privilege. Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 1924-36.
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2. Protection Under the Labor or "Sweat of the Brow"
Theory
The labor theory protected a compiler's investment of time and
money under the rationale that in many factual compilations there
was little original to the compiler except his hard work.17 How-
ever, Feist rejected the labor theory as inconsistent with the policies
of the Copyright Act and its statutory requirement of originality in
selection and arrangement." 9 Even though the labor theory has
been rejected, it is useful to examine how this theory would apply to
electronic data bases of facts. Rather than provide strong copyright
protection for the compiler of a data base, application of the labor
theory to data bases may conflict with the policy of copyright law
and grant protection based on an outdated notion of "labor."
In apparently the only reported case applying the labor theory
to an electronic data base, Telerate Systems, Inc. v. Caro,180 the Dis-
trict Court for the Southern District of New York rejected the fair
use defense of a defendant who produced computer software that
allowed its users to gain access to the plaintiff's financial informa-
tion data base. The court noted that the plaintiff's data base repre-
sented a significant investment of time and effort for the sole
purpose of financial return.181 Thus, even though the data base was
comprised of facts like stock quotations, its factual nature did not
weigh in favor of (nor against) a finding of fair use.182 One commen-
tator has criticized this result as conflicting with the copyright pol-
icy of encouraging widespread access to facts.18 3 This criticism is
valid and illustrates the primary drawback of the labor theory noted
by the Supreme Court in Feist: that facts were protected by virtue of
their compiler's effort and investment.18 4
As applied to the initial design and implementation of a data
178. See supra notes 43, 77-80.
179. See supra note 108.
180. 689 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
181. Id. at 229.
182. Id.
183. The rationale of Telerate Systems - that the factual nature of databases
does not weigh in favor of their fair use when they are expensive to create -
runs counter to the policy of encouraging a free flow of facts and ideas, which
underlies fair use doctrine and the first amendment. The predominant weight-
ing of the market effect adequately protects both the database owner's pecuni-
ary interest and the corresponding incentive for creativity.... Therefore, the
mere fact that a work is difficult or expensive to create should not determine its
"nature" for fair use purposes.
Jay Dratler, Jr., Distilling the Witches' Brew of Fair Use in Copyright Law, 43 U. MIAMI L.
REv. 233, 303 n.375 (1988).
184. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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base, a compiler's effort and investment would certainly qualify for
protection under the labor theory."8 5 The labor in designing and
implementing a data base mirrors the "industrious collection" stan-
dard of the early labor theory cases that envisaged the compiler go-
ing door-to-door gathering his facts." 6 However, much of the initial
design of a data base is predetermined by design standards and the
need for compatibility with other data bases. Thus, even the labor in
creating a data base from scratch is mitigated in kind and quantity
as compared to the industrious collector.
However, once designed and implemented, the information in
data bases is often compiled and updated using other data bases and
computer programs. Much of this process is automated. Thus, the
labor involved in compiling or updating an electronic data base may
be minimal. Many of the largest producers of data bases are also
their largest users"' and these producers use sophisticated hard-
ware and software to "roam computerized networks in search of
data needed for the compilation." '188 This mental labor - knowing
where to look and how to copy the necessary information - differs
in kind from the physical labor of the compiler walking the streets
in search of names and phone numbers. However, the degree to
which mental labor can be automated by a computer mitigates the
amount of labor actually expended in creating and compiling an
electronic data base. For example, a simple software program could
connect to a remote data base, copy the needed information to the
local data base, and disconnect itself when all the data is copied.
Mental labor is no less deserving of protection than physical labor,
but at some point both the mental and physical labor involved in
creating and updating electronic data bases may become so trivial
that it does not warrant copyright protection.189 Otherwise, the la-
bor theory might protect effort no more significant than that of
pressing a key.
3. Protection Under the Selection Theory
The selection theory provides copyright protection for a com-
pilation based on the originality of the compiler's selection of infor-
mation.190 The Supreme Court in Feist defined original selection as
185. The stages of development for a data base reflect a great deal of time and money on
the part of the compiler. See supra text accompanying notes 155-158.
186. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
187. IIA/ADAPSO Brief, supra note 3, at 3.
188. Id. at 20.
189. See Note, supra note 15, at 1026.
190. See supra text accompanying note 118.
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the compiler's use of enough creativity to raise his selection above
the obvious and to include more than the most basic information for
his particular compilation. 191 Because the selection theory focuses
on the compilation process, it shares the process focus with the la-
bor theory. Thus, fears that the demise of the labor theory precludes
courts from considering a compiler's actions are unfounded. How-
ever, under the Feist selection theory, a court must focus on the
compiler's actions in selecting information for his compilation, not
his labor in collecting that information. In other words, the selec-
tion theory provides protection to the data base compiler who
shows originality in his selection of the nature and types of different
information he includes in his data base.' 92
The selection theory is well-suited for electronic data bases be-
cause it reflects the intrinsic value of data bases'9 3 and the selection
process used to create and update data bases.' 94 Unlike the arrange-
ment theory, which provides protection based on an original, but
fixed, arrangement, the selection theory accommodates the dynamic
nature of data bases. Instead of dwelling on the easily modified
physical arrangement of information in a data base, the selection
theory focuses on the decisions made by the compiler in designing
his data base. The data base compiler's selection of the basic unit of
information, the model used to store information and present it to
users, the appropriate structure for accommodating changes to
data, and the appropriate description for the information' 9 is likely
to exhibit sufficient originality to invoke copyright protection.
In addition to these basic design decisions, a compiler selects
appropriate categories for his data base. These categories reflect the
nature of the information in the data base and must meet the expec-
tations and needs of data base users.196 The originality in the selec-
tion of categories comes from the compiler's recognition of the
needs of his target users and his choice of categories which meet
those needs. Clearly, many categories are self-evident, even essen-
tial, and appear to lack any trace of creativity sufficient to meet
Feist's originality requirement. For example, a data base of lawyers
191. See supra note 135.
192. Cf Gorman, supra note 1, at 572 n.30. "I suggest too that the very selection of the
pieces [for a hypothetical piano songbook], apart from their sequencing, constitutes sufficient
authorship for purposes of copyright protection, reflecting overall judgment regarding the
technique-building and pleasant-listening qualities of the pieces chosen."
193. IIA/ADAPSO Brief, supra note 3, at 12.
194. Id. at 18-19.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 160-171.
196. See supra text accompanying note 166.
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practicing in the United States must include categories for lawyer
name, firm name, address, and telephone number to be useful.
These categories alone in a data base would not show enough origi-
nality to invoke the selection theory and would be akin to the white
pages listings. However, by adding categories to the data base, such
as a list of representative clients, a description of practice areas, and
a statistical breakdown of the attorneys in each office, a compiler
begins to depart from the obvious and most basic information and
evidences sufficient originality to secure protection under the selec-
tion theory.
Even without adding new categories to the data base, a com-
piler may show sufficient originality by defining new relationships
between common categories.1 97 Or a compiler may link common
categories to larger categories which present standard information
in a new way.1 98 For example, an address category may be linked to
a larger category which lists law firms by geographic region or vary-
ing state bar admission requirements. A compiler may also refine
obvious categories into new, more focused categories. An address
category can be refined into a county category and a list of represen-
tative litigation can be refined into a category containing the juris-
dictions and courts in which the litigation occurred. In each case, as
long as the compiler selects non-obvious categories or defines new
relationships between common categories, he is likely to meet Feist's
threshold requirement of originality for his selection.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has shown that between the arrangement and
selection theories of compilations accepted by the Supreme Court in
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,' 99 the selec-
tion theory is the most useful for determining whether an electronic
data base of facts is protected by copyright law. As defined by the
Court in Feist, the selection theory grants copyright protection in a
factual compilation based on originality in the compiler's selection.
In framing this standard, the Court reiterated the low threshold of
originality required to invoke copyright protection. By setting a low
standard for originality, the Court intended that protection would
attach to all compilations, both printed and electronic, except those
which contain the most obvious and basic information. Only factual
works devoid of even the smallest trace of originality, such as the
197. See supra text accompanying note 169.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 167-168.
199. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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white pages listings at issue in Feist, would fail to secure copyright
protection under the Feist selection theory.
Most importantly, the Feist selection theory satisfies the goal of
copyright law which seeks to maintain incentives for authors to cre-
ate factual works while also preserving the public interest in free
access to facts and ideas. By exercising original selection in the de-
sign of a data base or printed compilation, a compiler earns copy-
right protection which grants the compiler the right to sell and copy
his work in order to make a return on his financial investment. This
satisfies the incentive goal and ensures that compilers will continue
to produce factual works. At the same time, the selection theory
preserves free access to individual facts in copyrightable compila-
tions which satisfies copyright's public dissemination and access
goal. This access ensures the continued development of the arts and
sciences.
It may seem unfair that much of the fruit of the compiler's labor
may be used by others without compensation .... [T]his is not
"some unforeseen byproduct of a statutory scheme." . . . It is,
rather, "the essence of copyright," ... and a constitutional re-
quirement. The primary objective of copyright is not to reward
the labor of authors, but "[tlo promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts. 2 °°
200. Id. at 1289-90 (citations omitted).
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